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INTRODUCTION
By the time more than 1,000 members of the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (“ACT UP”)
surrounded the FDA’s headquarters on the morning of October 11, 1988, more than 62,000
Americans had already died of HIV/AIDS.1 The epidemic, though only a few years old, was claiming
thousands of lives a month and new diagnoses were increasing exponentially.2 The members of ACT
UP had gathered outside of the FDA’s suburban Maryland headquarters to demand several
immediate steps to stem the flood of AIDS-related illness and death.3
The conceptual thread connecting the demands made of the FDA that day was expanding
access to experimental drug therapy and treatment for the seriously or terminally ill.4 Although the
FDA had—just over a year before the mass demonstration—implemented a new avenue for access,5
those actually suffering from terminal illness had not experienced any significant relief.6 The
demonstrators demanded that the FDA shorten the drug approval process for the seriously or
terminally-ill by allowing access to experimental drugs as early as the beginning of Phase 2 trials.7
Further, ACT UP called for the end of double-blind placebo trials—in which some subjects will
necessarily receive a placebo and not the new treatment—due to ethical concerns.8 While these
demands were not immediately met by the FDA9, they did raise the profile of terminally-ill patients
and the groups that advocate for them.10
1

Cathy Olufs, The AIDS Timeline, available at http://www.thebody.com/content/art390.html#1988.
Craig A. Rimmerman, ACT UP, available at http://www.thebody.com/content/art14001.html.
3
Douglas Crimp, Before Occupy: How AIDS Activists Seized Control of the FDA in 1988, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2011/12/before-occupy-how-aids-activists-seized-control-of-the-fda-in1988/249302/.
4
Id.
5
Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations; Treatment Use and Sale, 52 Fed.
Reg. 19,466 (May 22, 1987). Commonly known as the Treatment IND application (discussed in detail below), this
was the FDA’s somewhat belated attempt at responding to rising criticism of its drug approval process (also
discussed in detail below).
6
Olufs, Rimmerman, and Crimp all attest to the inadequacy of the currently available remedies in 1987-88.
7
Crimp. The FDA’s multi-phase drug approval process will be described below, but for immediate explanatory
purposes, access in the beginning of Phase 2 trials would have been unprecedentedly early access.
8
Crimp, Before Occupy.
9
Rimmerman, ACT UP.
10
Philip J. Hilts, How the AIDS Crisis Made Drug Regulators Speed Up, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1989, at D5.
2
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The ACT UP demonstration—and the FDA’s response to the horrible crisis that motivated
it—illustrates a critical shortcoming in modern American healthcare. The desperation of the
protestors that morning, driving them to forcibly occupy the headquarters of an entity created to
protect them, was a result of the FDA’s utter failure to adapt to the needs of terminally-ill patients.11
Today, nearly thirty years after the ACT UP demonstrations, individuals with serious or terminal
illnesses face similar challenges. Ironically, while ACT UP was protesting FDA inaction, the primary
obstacle now to accessing developmental treatment is a recent FDA action.12
Individual autonomy, the freedom of a man or woman to make fundamental life-decisions for
themselves, is not only a deeply held and jealously guarded concept in the U.S., it is one of the
founding principles of the nation.13 Yet in some realms of the healthcare industry, especially in the
regulation of clinical access to developmental drugs for the critically ill, individual autonomy is
severely restrained.14 Entities empowered to limit individual freedom and autonomy are, in almost
every instance, given that authority in order to act in the best interest of the individual.15 In essence,
government agencies like the FDA really only exist—as their statutory mandates make plain—to
protect the life and health of citizens. When an agency regulates individual behavior which does not
endanger the lives of others—especially when Congress has not given the agency explicit power to
prohibit that behavior—or when it restricts conduct and behavior that may very well save an
individual’s life, that agency has overstepped it mandate.16

11

Crimp, Before Occupy.
21 C.F.R. §312.34 (the 1987 Treatment IND) and its replacement (the 2009 regulations, to be codified at §312 and
§316). Section 312.305 of the 2009 regulations functions as the most significant obstacle.
13
Jerry Menikoff, Law and Bioethics, p. 356 (2001). Menikoff is one of many excellent sources on the centrality of
individual autonomy in American life and culture; for the purposes of this paper, he very effectively ties this concept
to bioethics and medical decision-making.
14
Abigail Alliance, http://abigail –alliance.org/ (last accessed 10/30/2012).
15
Stephen G. Breyer, et al., Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy, p. 1-3 (2006).
16
This point is best illustrated by the development of the “Chevron Doctrine” by the Supreme Court. Outlined in the
majority’s opinion in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the
Court held that when a legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit, a
court may not substitute its own construction of the statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of the agency. If the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the Court said, the
12
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In the context of regulating access to experimental drugs, the FDA is tasked with assessing
both the safety and effectiveness of the proposed new drug.17 The FDA has attempted to satisfy this
mandate by creating a multi-phase clinical trial process, and strictly limiting access to the drug while
it is being assessed.18 Patients who satisfy the rigorous requirements for entrance into a trial may
access a drug in Phase 2 testing.19 However, those who are seriously or terminally-ill typically cannot
meet these requirements.20 For over 25 years, they simply had to wait until testing was completed, a
process that averages 12 years.21 Since 1987, the FDA has made multiple attempts to expand access
to experimental drugs for the seriously or terminally-ill, with little success.22 The most recent
incarnation of this parade of half-measures came in 2009, when the FDA promulgated a new set of
regulations to replace the 1987 rules.23 The new rules attempted to expand access to those
disqualified from clinical trials by allowing access when the patient’s treating physician has
determined that several treatment criteria have been met.24 The fundamental flaw in the new

question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. In the
context of the FDA, this doctrine was recently applied in Food and Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). The Court held that the FDA’s regulations were invalid because Congress had already
created a clear and explicit stance on regulation of tobacco products.
17
Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962).
18
21 C.F.R. §355(b)(5).
19
Id. at § 312.305. One enormous caveat to this early access—to be discussed in detail below—is the fact that
controlled trial participants (most clinical trials overseen by the FDA have control groups) stand a good chance of
receiving a placebo. Therefore, at least some controlled trial participants will unknowingly receive a placebo and
thus not receive the experimental treatment.
20
Most studies self-select for subjects afflicted only with the specific disease targeted by the drug, with any other
conditions seen as potentially complicating or obscuring any data gathered. Unfortunately, those who are seriously
or terminally-ill rarely have only one significant medical condition (serious illness usually including multiple comorbidities), and would thus be disqualified from most clinical trials. Two excellent resources on co-morbidity and
it’s impact on healthcare decisions—up to and including trial participation—are M. van den Akker, et al,
Multimorbidity in General Practice: Prevalence, Incidence, and Determinants of Co-occurring Chronic and
Recurrent Diseases, J Clin Epidemiol, 51:367–375 (1998), and M. Fortin, et al, Prevalence of Multimorbidity
Among Adults Seen In Family Practice, Ann Fam Med, 3:223–8 (2005).
21
Elizabeth M. Rutherford, The FDA and “Privatization”—The Drug Approval Process, 50 Food & Drug L.J. 213
(1995).
22
21 C.F.R. §312. Codified in 1987 but substantially amended by the 2009 regulations.
23
Id. at §312.305(a)(2).
24
Id. at §312.305(b)(2). Section 312.305 generally establishes a new multi-step program (to be discussed in detail
below) for access for those excluded from participating in a clinical trial, but this is the key provision that inserts the
FDA into the physician-patient relationship.
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regulations—specifically section 312.305—is that they require the FDA to do a “risk-benefit”
analysis of the physician’s decision before releasing the drug.25
This paper argues that, while the FDA’s attempts to expand access to experimental drug
treatment for the seriously and terminally-ill is laudable, it not only falls short of achieving its
objective, it oversteps its statutory authority. The FDA is tasked with assessing the safety and
efficacy of proposed drugs before they are released to the public, not with assessing the private,
intimate discussions and decisions made between a patient and her physician. Individual autonomy is
a central and deeply-held concept in this country, and it is an especially central concern in the context
of healthcare decision-making.
This paper will address this fundamental point in five parts. Part I will discuss the history of
the FDA’s statutory mandate to assess the safety and effectiveness of drugs. Part II will discuss and
analyze the FDA’s effort to satisfy this mandate through the clinical trial process. Part III will discuss
and analyze the FDA’s recent attempts to expand access to experimental drugs for the seriously and
terminally-ill. Part IV will discuss the various legal and ethical concerns raised by expanding access.
Part V will offer critiques of the FDA’s efforts, as well as recommending possible improvements that
could both expand access and address the concerns discussed in Part IV.
I. BACKGROUND
A. FDA’s Mandate and the Statutory Basis for Regulation of Access
Since its inception in 1938, the FDA has been tasked with ensuring that all drugs offered for
general use have been subjected to rigorous pre-market testing.26 The Food Drug and Cosmetic Act

25

Id.
David G. Adams, Food and Drug Law and Regulation, p. 3 (2nd ed. 2011). Prior to the creation of the FDA,
Congress had authorized the USDA’s Bureau of Chemistry to monitor drugs for any adulteration or misbranding.
The Bureau could recommend that a violator be prosecuted by the Department of Justice, but the law did not
authorize any pre-market review or intervention before distribution. Essentially, from the Federal government’s
entrance into the arena of drug regulation in 1906 until the creation of the FDA in 1938, the regulatory scheme was
entirely reactive and only addressed issues of adulteration or misbranding as they arose. With the passage of the
FDCA, many of these early deficiencies were remedied. The new law authorized pre-market review of drugs, and
established standards for the safety, identification, quality, and manufacture of those drugs. For the first time, the
26
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of 1938 (“FDCA”) established two separate but complimentary schemes for the FDA’s new role as
pre-market drug regulator.27 In the first, the FDA relied on the adulteration and misbranding
provisions of the FDCA to address claims about the integrity and quality of drugs.28 This scheme
closely tracked the early, pre-FDA attempts at intervention based on allegations from consumers, and
was rarely invoked in the drug context. In the second and more expansive scheme, the FDA
functioned as a pro-active gatekeeper assessing drug safety before marketing.29 Utilizing the new
drug application (“NDA”) provisions established by the FDCA30, the FDA required any
manufacturer of a new drug to submit a full report outlining the proposed drug’s safety, as well as
several other quality control elements.31 In essence, the FDA could restrict—and even prohibit—the
introduction of any new drug it found unsafe. This new authority effectively closed the enforcement
gap inherent in the 1906 Act and allowed the FDA to play an integral role not only in the marketing
and manufacture of new drugs, but in their very inception.32
This new, more proactive role for the FDA was intensified with the passage of the KefauverHarris Amendments of 1962 (the “Drug Amendments”).33 Throughout the late 1950’s, the drug
Thalidomide was widely used in Europe as a morning sickness treatment for pregnant women. In an

Federal government was not just responding, ad hoc, to allegations of adulteration or misbranding, but was actually
intervening before drugs were introduced onto the market.
27
Daniel Kracov, Food and Drug Law and Regulation, p. 317 (2nd ed. 2011).
28
FDCA of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1932) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)
(2000)). Section 505(a) specifically refers to “adulteration” and “misbranding”.
29
Id. at (b)
30
Id. A “new drug” under the 1938 FDCA was defined as:
“Any drug ... the composition of which is such that such drug is not generally recognized, among experts
... as safe and effective for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested ... [or] any
drug ... the composition of which is such that such drug, as a result of investigations to determine its
safety and effectiveness for use under such conditions, has become so recognized, but which has not,
otherwise than in such investigations, been used to a material extent or for a material time under such
conditions”.
31
FDCA of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1932) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §
355(a)(1)(2000)). The FDCA of 1938 required that a full report of the investigations on a drug's safety be
submitted including a full list of the components of the drug, a full description of the method used in
manufacturing and packing the drug, and samples of the drug and the proposed labeling.
32
Under the idea that industry would now have to actively anticipate an FDA pre-market response rather than just
mitigate a post-marketing consumer complaint based on misbranding, etc.
33
Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962).
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effort to introduce the drug in the U.S., the manufacturer applied to the FDA for a new drug
approval.34 Just before widespread distribution commenced, the FDA’s commissioner put a hold on
the drug due to emerging adverse reactions reports.35 Ultimately, the U.S. was only minimally
affected by the risks posed by Thalidomide, due in large part to the efforts of the FDA to keep the
drug off the market.36 This brush with pharmacological disaster led both the American people, and
Congress, to demand more of FDA; and this charge came with commensurate authority. The Drug
Amendments were almost as earth-shaking for the FDA and drug industry regulation as the FDCA
itself because they charged the agency with assessing not only the safety of a proposed drug, but its
efficacy for treating the targeted disease or condition as well.37
II. THE FDA’S REGULATION OF ACCESS THROUGH THE CLINICAL TRIAL PROCESS
Under the Drug Amendments, the FDA must engage in a rigorous analysis of both safety and
efficacy in every NDA it receives.38 This pre-market, pre-approval analysis must conclude that the
new drug’s claims of safety and efficacy are supported by “substantial evidence”.39 The FDA has
interpreted “substantial evidence” to mean evidence from adequate and well-controlled clinical
studies.40 And the FDA has historically required at least two independent studies to demonstrate
minimal efficacy.41 Manufacturers of a new drug must obtain pre-market FDA approval by
submitting an application containing data which confirms some baseline level of safety and

34

Sam Peltzman, An Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation: The 1962 Drug Amendments. The Journal of
Political Economy, Vol. 81, No. 5., pp.1051 (Sep.- Oct., 1973).
35
Id.
36
Much of Europe was not so fortunate, Thalidomide has been estimated to have caused serious birth defects in at
least 10,000 children; this compared to only seventeen in the U.S. Linda Bren, Frances Oldham Kelsey: FDA
Medical Reviewer Leaves Her Mark on History, FDA Consumer Magazine, Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 24.
37
James N. Czaban & Geoffrey M. Levitt, Food and Drug Law and Regulation, p. 377 (2nd ed. 2011).
38
FDCA § 505(d), 21 U.S.C. § 355(d).
39
21 C.F.R. § 314.105(c).
40
FDCA § 505(d), 21 U.S.C. § 355(d).
41
Statement Regarding the Demonstrations of Effectiveness of Human Drug Products and Devices, Notice, 60 Fed.
Reg. 39,180, 39,181 (1995).
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efficacy.42 Integral to this drug approval process are clinical trials, especially those involving
humans, and the FDA has aggressively regulated the process since 1962.43
A. The Pre-Trial Approval Process
Following the passage of the Drug Amendments, the FDA established a multi-phase process
for pre-market testing and approval of new drugs.44 To accomplish the goal of rigorously assessing
both safety and efficacy, the FDA required all prospective marketers and manufacturers of new drugs
to file an Investigational New Drug application (“IND”) before commencing trials on human
subjects.45 The purpose of an IND application is to both alert the FDA that a drug sponsor is hoping
to initiate clinical testing, and to offer data showing that this testing would at least not pose an
unacceptable risk of harm to human subjects.46 To further protect potential human subjects, the IND
must contain a commitment from the sponsor to conduct the proposed clinical trials under the
supervision of an Institutional Review Board (“IRB”).47 The fundamental purpose of an IRB is to
ensure that the rights and welfare of the human subjects are protected.48 To facilitate this protective
purpose, IRBs—and the INDs creating them—must operate under a vigorous Informed Consent
(“IC”) rubric.49 The principal thrust of the IC regulations are to ensure that the human subject’s
participation in the trials is voluntary and knowing.50 Potential candidates must be adequately

42

21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2000).
Id. § 355(b)(5).
44
Czaban, at 364.
45
21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(5).
46
Specific IND contents vary by drug, but all INDs must include the following basic elements: 1) an introductory
statement and general investigative plan, 2) a set of comprehensive investigative protocols, 3) information on the
proposed drug’s chemistry, manufacturing and controls, 4) pharmacology and toxicology information from preclinical studies, 5) a summary of previous human experience with the drug, etc. For the full list see 21 C.F.R. §
312.23.
47
IRBs play a central role both in the IND and in the subsequent running of the trial. The IRB’s role in the Informed
Consent context is more relevant to this paper, but the board must also take a sufficiently active role in the conduct
of the study to ensure that pertinent medical and scientific standards are maintained, as well as maintaining general
compliance with FDA standards and regulations. In essence, the IRB is the trial’s functional and logistical manager,
as well as its moral compass. 21 C.F.R. § 312.56 and Czaban, at 362-63.
48
21 C.F.R. § 312.56.
49
21 C.F.R. §312.50
50
Id. Further, subjects cannot be forced to waive any potential future claims for negligence against the study’s
sponsor, and may withdraw consent at anytime without penalty or loss of benefit. In an attempt to balance the
43
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informed about risks, possible benefits, alternative courses of treatment and other relevant
information before consenting.51
B. The Clinical Trial Process
Once the drug sponsor has gathered sufficient data evidencing safety for introduction into a
human subject pool and compiled a satisfactory IRB protocol and the FDA has approved these
efforts, the actual clinical trial may begin.52 The FDA has created a multi-phase trial process that
consists of three principal phases followed by one possible, though not always mandatory, postapproval phase.53 Phase 1 involves the initial administration of the experimental drug to human
subjects.54 The stated purpose of this initial data gathering is “to determine the metabolism and
pharmacological actions of the drug in humans, the side effects associated with increasing doses, and,
if possible, to gain early evidence on effectiveness”.55 Although any early evidence on effectiveness
is recorded and reported to the FDA, the central goal of Phase 1 testing is to determine the
metabolism and toxicity properties of the new drug in relation to use in healthy test subjects.56 Phase
1 trials really only demonstrate that a proposed experimental drug will not seriously harm a healthy
subject; therefore it is important not to rely too heavily on results from this early stage for potential

autonomy of the subject with concerns over her safety, the FDA promulgated regulations providing a narrow
exception to the general IC requirements. In cases where: 1) a subject is in a life-threatening situation and all other
available treatments are unproven or unsatisfactory; or 2) the subject cannot provide effective consent due to his or
her medical condition; or 3) treatment must be administered before consent from a legal representative is feasible,
the IC requirements may be lessened or in some other way mitigated. The exception also requires that the use of the
experimental drug holds the potential to benefit the patient, that the investigation could not practicably be carried out
without the waiver, and that additional patient protections are provided.
51
Id. §50.25
52
James N. Czaban & Geoffrey M. Levitt, Food and Drug Law and Regulation, pp. 361-62 (2nd ed. 2011).
53
Id. at 364.
54
21 C.F.R. §312.21(a)(1).
55
Id.
56
Susan Okie, Access Before Approval—A Right to Take Experimental Drugs?, 355 New Eng. J. Med. 437, 438
(2006).
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disease treatment opportunities.57 Finally, the drug’s sponsor must derive sufficient pharmacokinetic
and general pharmacological data from Phase 1 trials to devise appropriate and safe Phase 2 studies.58
Phase 2 trials mark the beginning of experimental drug testing on subjects with the targeted
illness.59 Once the drug has been shown to pose no immediate risk to healthy test subjects, it is
introduced to a much larger test population, which includes individuals suffering from the disease or
illness the new drug purports to treat.60 The trial group may include as many as several hundred
subjects, and the stated purpose of this phase is to “obtain evidence of the drug’s effectiveness
against the targeted disease, to explore further risk and side-effect issues and to confirm preliminary
data regarding optimal dosage ranges.”61 Phase 2 trials typically run for about two years62, and the
FDA requires that they operate as adequate and well-controlled studies allowing for clear
identification of the effects of the drug, as well as differentiation between the effects of the study
drug and any effects emanating from other factors.63 To effectively differentiate between the effects
of the study drug and any effects arising out of other sources, most trials will involve randomly
assigned control groups receiving either placebos or the “best current” treatment; results from these
groups are then given a blind outcome assessment.64
Because Phase 2 study participants have the potential for unknowingly receiving either the
experimental study drug, the “best currently available” treatment or a placebo, sponsors must
explicitly inform participants that they are involved in an experimental study and not experimental
treatment.65 Further, most sponsors call study participants subjects rather than patients to emphasize

57

In essence, this early testing may produce some data on efficacy, but its relevance to the treatment of specific
diseases is fundamentally limited by the nature and composition of the testing sample.
58
James N. Czaban & Geoffrey M. Levitt, Food and Drug Law and Regulation, p. 364 (2nd ed. 2011).
59
Id.
60
21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b).
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
P.P. De Deyn & R. D’Hooge, Placebos in Clinical Practice and Research, 22 J. Med. Ethics 140-141 (1996).
64
Id.
65
Frances H. Miller, Symposium Trust Relationships Part 1 of 2: Trusting Doctors: Tricky Business When it Comes
to Clinical Research, 81 B.U. L. Rev. 423-433 (2001). This explicit distinction between “experimental treatment”
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this distinction.66 To further cement this distinction, the FDA has mandated that Phase 2 studies are
not meant to function as treatment but are solely intended to evaluate whether the experimental drug
offers therapeutic benefits.67 If the drug sponsor is able to gather adequate data evidencing
effectiveness against the targeted disease, indications for optimal dosage, and showing minimal
negative side-effects from usage, the drug may move on to the third and final stage of pre-market
testing.68
Phase 3 clinical trials commence once the drug’s sponsor has gathered and presented this
“preliminary evidence suggesting [that the] effectiveness of the drug” adequately balances out the
risk to the patient, and the FDA accepts the data.69 The primary goal of a Phase 3 trial is to collect the
data necessary to meet the safety and efficacy standards required by the FDCA, which the FDA has
interpreted to mean any and all data needed to “evaluate the overall benefit-risk relationship of the
drug and to provide an adequate basis for physician labeling” and prescription.70 Once an adequate
amount of data on the drug’s risk-benefit profile has been gathered, the sponsor files a summary
NDA with the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research for final marketing approval.71 The
FDA must then decide whether to request additional safety and efficacy testing, or approve the drug
for introduction into the market and use by the general public.72 If the FDA requests a further level of

and “experimental study” is central to the issue of patient autonomy because it clearly demonstrates that the FDA
believes that, as long as a potential participant is not unduly influenced by hopes for an experimental treatment or
“cure”, they may make a free choice to participate.
66
Id.
67
45 C.F.R. § 46.109 (2007). In the second, wider phase of testing, the IRB’s task of creating and enforcing an
adequate informed consent rubric would seem to be much more complicated. In Phase 1, subjects are presumably
participating purely for remunerative purposes, and the potential ethical dilemmas are minimal. In Phase 2 however,
participants may be motivated by much more complicated incentives (as will be discussed below), and the IRB must
respond appropriately when devising an IC scheme.
68
Id.
69
21 C.F.R. § 312.21(c).
70
Id. This final pre-market phase may involve up to several thousand subjects, frequently takes place in multiple
locations, and includes both controlled and uncontrolled testing.
71
FDA’s Drug Review Process, Food and Drug Admin.,
www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/ucm143534.htm (last accessed 10/18/12).
72
Id.
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testing, there are two options at their disposal. The agency may employ either a fourth trial phase73,
or conduct what is called a Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (“REMS”)74. If, however, the
FDA concludes that the drug’s risk-benefit profile (as measured by safety and efficacy data) is
satisfactory, it will approve the drug for introduction into the public market.
Historically, this process has taken roughly 12 years to complete75, and pharmaceutical
companies claim that the cumulative cost can average up to one billion dollars for each new drug.76
Due to these cost and time pressures, the FDA has faced consistent pleas from the drug industry to
accelerate the pace of drug approvals.77 The FDA also, however, has been faced with several
scenarios which seem to illustrate the importance of a robust and detailed pre-clearance process.78
These often well-publicized adverse outcomes add pressure to an agency trying to balance consumer
safety, industry innovation, and patient autonomy.
III. A HISTORY OF THE FDA’S ATTEMPTS TO EXPAND ACCESS
A. The Aftermath of the 1962 Amendments: U.S. v. Rutherford and Treatment INDs
Since the passage of the 1962 amendments and the new mandate to assess both safety and
effectiveness, the FDA has been under sustained pressure to accelerate the drug approval process.79
Pharmaceutical companies have argued that the U.S. lags far behind other nations in both drug

Phase 4 trials may be initiated pursuant to 21 C.F.R. § 314(h)’s accelerated approval provisions, they may also be
agreed to between the sponsor and FDA to further address safety issues, or they may be voluntarily conducted by the
sponsor to expand labeling for the drug. Further, a fourth phase of testing may be required under the FDAAA (James
N. Czaban & Geoffrey M. Levitt, Food and Drug Law and Regulation, p. 364 (2nd ed. 2011)).
74
FDCA § 505-1(a)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(a)(1), added by Pub. Law No. 110-85, tit. IX. REMS is provided for
under the authority of the FDAAA, and FDA may require a sponsor to include a REMS in its NDA if the agency
deems it necessary to ensure that the benefits of the drug outweigh the risks.
75
Elizabeth M. Rutherford, The FDA and “Privatization”—The Drug Approval Process, 50 Food & Drug L.J. 203,
213 (1995).
76
Joseph DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. Health Econ.,
151 (2003).
77
Leonard G. Shifrin, Lessons from the Drug Lag: A Retrospective Analysis of the 1962 Drug Regulations, 5 Harv.
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 91 (1982).
78
Gardiner Harris, FDA Official Admits “Lapses” on Vioxx, www.nytimes.com/2005/03/02/politics/02fda.html (last
accessed 10/18/2012). The Vioxx incident is merely the most recent and high-profile of a number of dramatic recalls
of approved drugs from the market due to significant, and sometimes foreseeable, health risks.
79
Leonard G. Shifrin, Lessons from the Drug Lag: A Retrospective Analysis of the 1962 Drug Regulations, 5 Harv.
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 91 (1982).
73
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approval rates and the time it takes to get a drug to market, and patient advocacy groups maintain that
these shortcomings put their members at grave risk.80 The first major challenge to the agency’s new
role—created by the Drug Amendments—of assessing a drug’s “safety and effectiveness” came in
1979 when a group of terminally ill cancer patients sought to enjoin the FDA from prohibiting the
dissemination of a new, unapproved cancer drug.81 The cancer patients sought to establish a right to
the unapproved drugs—and thus escape the reach of the FDA’s safe and effective requirement—due
to the end-stage or terminal nature of their illness.82 The Supreme Court explicitly rejected this
position, holding that the FDA was well within its statutory authority when it interpreted the FDCA
to encompass even those drugs aimed at benefitting the terminally ill.83 Further, in discussing the
importance of the new effectiveness prong of the FDA’s analysis, the Court held that “there is a
special sense in which the relationship between drug effectiveness and safety has meaning in the
context of incurable illnesses [because] an otherwise harmless drug can be dangerous to any patient if
it does not produce its purported therapeutic effect.”84 In the first major challenge to the FDA’s
authority to limit access to experimental drugs under the new safe and effective pre-market analysis,
the Court found that the FDA not only possessed the requisite authority to limit access, it was
obligated to do so. However, eight years after this setback for patient choice, the FDA introduced a
new avenue of access for terminally ill patients.

Id. Shifrin mentions that, by the 1980’s, the U.S. had fallen behind other industrialized nations not only in drug
approval times, but even in the gross number of medications that ultimately made it to market. Pharmaceutical
companies concluded, logically it would seem, that the ordeal of the approval process ended up generally reducing
the industry’s incentive to even introduce experimental drugs.
81
United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 542 (1979).
82
Id. at 546.
83
Id. at 551-552. The majority went on to elaborate that the terminally ill (because of the nature of their illness and
the psychological and emotional vulnerability resulting from it) are perhaps the most at-risk members of the group
FDA is mandated to protect, and thus the statutory obligation to pre-authorize drug use is most critical in this
scenario.
84
Id. at 556. The Court went on to state that “[f]or this reason, even before the 1962 Amendments incorporated an
efficacy standard into new drug application procedures, the FDA considered effectiveness when reviewing the safety
of drugs used to treat terminal illness.” Id.
80
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In 1987, the FDA created the Treatment IND in an attempt to expand access to experimental
drugs for the seriously and terminally-ill.85 The Treatment IND was a significant breakthrough for
both advocacy groups and patients because it provided access to investigational drugs outside of the
context of controlled clinical trials.86 This new IND option further modified the standard application
process in that it allowed access—for certain patient groups—to an experimental drug if sponsors
could establish that: (1) the drug is intended “to treat a serious or immediately life-threatening
disease”, (2) there is “no comparable or satisfactory alternative” treatment, (3) the drug “is under
investigation in a controlled clinical trial”, and (4) the sponsor is “actively pursuing market
approval”.87 The Secretary of Health and Human Services (“HHS”)88 is empowered to decide
whether there is adequate evidence of both safety and effectiveness for the proposed use of the
drug.89 Despite its initial promise, patients and advocates quickly found that the new scheme
ultimately did little to expand access for the critically ill.90
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As implemented by the FDA, the Treatment IND option effectively foreclosed potential
candidates from gaining access until well into the third phase of ongoing trials.91 Citing concerns
over both consumer and industry protection, the FDA argued that allowing access at any time before
Phase 3 would endanger patients as well as potentially reduce the number of willing participants in
future experimental drug trials.92 As a result of this concern, the Treatment IND is practically only
available in Phase 3 or beyond.93 The FDA did carve out one very narrow exception to this rule—in
the case of an immediately life-threatening disease when all other treatment options have been
exhausted—by allowing access between the post-Phase 2 period and the beginning of Phase 3.94
However, even this patient “in extremis” cannot get access before the conclusion of Phase 2, and
even then the Commissioner may deny access.95 Another aspect of the Treatment IND which
ultimately limited program usage was originally intended as a cost-control device to protect
consumers. 96 Burdened by these issues—and widely criticized as both “inadequate and
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underutilized”97—the Treatment IND program was eventually viewed even by the FDA as a failed
attempt to expand access.98 In an effort to remedy this shortcoming, and expand access “to
investigational products intended for serious diseases”, Congress stepped in and passed the Food and
Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (“FDAMA”).99
B. The Patient, the Physician and the FDA: The FDAMA and the FDA’s 2009 Regulations
In passing the FDAMA, Congress explicitly set out to establish a route to access for the
individual patient excluded—for whatever reason—from the clinical trial process.100 Specifically,
section 360bbb states that individual patients seeking treatment outside of clinical trials and “acting
through a physician...may request from a manufacturer or distributor...an investigational drug or
investigational device,” subject to certain conditions.101 Section 360bbb of the FDAMA, like the
Treatment IND before it, maintains the two-tier test for serious and terminally ill patients.102
Functionally, section 360bbb makes no mention of FDA supervision or input outside of determining
whether the proposed new treatment has been shown to be at least minimally safe and effective.103
Under the new framework, the decision to seek an experimental treatment is one for the patient and
her physician alone, with the FDA merely deciding whether initial clinical trials have established
some level of safety and efficacy.
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In response to growing criticism over the discrepancy between the promise of expanded
access under the §360bbb framework and the actual state of things,104 the FDA created new rules for
its developmental drugs access scheme.105 The final rules, promulgated in 2009, established three
population categories eligible for expanded access: 1) individual patients (including emergency
requests, formerly known as “compassionate” or “emergency use” INDs), 2) intermediate-sized
patient groups, and 3) general access (also known as a treatment protocol).106 Further, the new
regulations established a baseline criteria for expanded access, stating that the FDA must determine:
1) that “the patient or patients to be treated have a serious or immediately life-threatening disease or
condition, and there is no comparable or satisfactory alternative therapy to diagnose, monitor, or treat
the disease or condition;” 2) “[t]he potential patient benefit justifies the potential risks of the
treatment use and those potential risks are not unreasonable in the context of the disease or condition
to be treated;” and 3) “[p]roviding the investigational drug for the requested use will not interfere
with the initiation, conduct, or completion of clinical investigations that could support marketing
approval of the expanded access use or otherwise compromise the potential development of the
expanded access use.”107 Under the 2009 rules, the FDA evaluates the operative criteria on a sliding
scale, which in some cases could provide access to drugs based on as little as early Phase 1 safety
data.108 The rules also clarified that eligible patients must have a serious disease or condition, but do
not need to be currently considered seriously-ill with that specific disease or condition.109
In promulgating the new rules, the FDA intended to clarify existing procedure, create new
categories of expanded access, and “improve access to investigational drugs for patients with serious
or immediately life-threatening diseases or conditions who lack other therapeutic options and who
104
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may benefit from such therapies.”110 In an attempt to balance the agency’s mandate to foster research
and development while also protecting potential consumers, the FDA sought to “appropriately
authoriz[e] access to promising drugs while protecting patient safety and avoiding interference with
the development of investigational drugs.”111 To further this effort at balancing the competing
interests involved in the expanded access context, the FDA also promulgated new regulations to
allow drug sponsors to recover the cost of expanded access to investigational drugs.112 Specifically,
drug sponsors can recover the direct costs of making the investigational drug available, which are
typically limited to the costs of manufacturing and shipping the drugs as well as monitoring the
treatment protocol.113 Finally, in yet another attempt to balance the interests of patients, physicians,
and pharmaceutical manufacturers with the pressures of the FDA's mandate to evaluate new and
experimental drugs, the new rules required that doctors overseeing patients with access to
investigational drugs outside of clinical trials report both positive and adverse outcomes to the
FDA.114 Beyond ensuring that each instance of expanded access does not interfere with a sponsor’s
clinical testing of the proposed new drug, this measure seems to facilitate an expanded access
program actually making a contribution to the FDA's evaluation of a drug.
Taken together, Congress’ creation of a pathway to access—by passing section 360bbb of the
FDAMA—and the FDA’s subsequent promulgation of the 2009 rules are a significant development
for terminally-ill patients. However, while these measures seem to offer an increased opportunity for
patient autonomy and decision-making, a single provision in the FDA’s new rules stands as both an
unprecedented expansion of the agency’s authority as well as a significant obstacle to expanded
access. Section 312.305 of the 2009 regulations, which authorizes the FDA to assess the
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“reasonableness” of a patient’s decision to take a developmental drug,115 threatens to undermine the
promise of expanded access created by §360bbb. Without corrective action, this single provision
could prevent seriously or terminally-ill patients from accessing the developmental treatments
Congress intended to authorize in the FDAMA.
IV. THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF EXPANDING ACCESS
While the FDA has attempted—through the various means described above—to expand
access to developmental drugs for the terminally ill, these efforts have only served to restrict and
complicate matters. Opponents of deregulation argue that the risk of expanding access outweighs any
potential benefit,116 but while there are considerable legal and ethical concerns implicated by
expanded access, individual patient autonomy should trump the FDA’s authority to regulate in this
area. When analyzing the varied and competing interests involved in the regulation of developmental
drugs, and the potential ethical and legal implications created by their interaction, addressing each of
the key actors in the enterprise is worthwhile.
A. The Seriously-Ill Patient
The argument advanced most often by both patients and their advocates is that, when
suffering from a serious or terminal illness, time is of the essence.117 Completion of the full clinical
trial process averages 12 years,118 and many patients simply cannot wait this long. Abigail
Burroughs—after whom the Abigail Alliance is named—is a striking example of a young person
who lost her battle with cancer while a promising developmental drug slowly progressed through the
clinical trial process.119 This tragic outcome illustrates the moral hazard created by withholding a
potentially life-saving drug, because it might be dangerous, while the patient slowly succumbs to
115
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their illness.120 Referring to this dilemma, a former senior FDA official said that “delaying new
treatments for the sake of generating more rigorous and complete medical evidence helps patients, to
a point. But in the field of cancer…the FDA’s strict posture is probably overkill…and many more
patients will die waiting for the good medicines than from using the bad ones.”121 When weighing the
risk of imminent death from an untreated or untreatable illness and potentially suffering an adverse
reaction to a developmental drug that could be life-saving, it is the individual actually facing death
who should ultimately make that decision.122
A discussion of this patient-directed risk-benefit analysis is not complete without a discussion
of the forces and pressures inherent in the decision. The most glaring and obvious factor would seem
to be the acute physical condition of the patient herself.123 Many commentators argue that not only is
it impossible for an patient in extremis to make this decision objectively and reasonably, it is
unethical for a physician—and the government tasked with protecting that patient—to accept
whatever decision the individual happens to make.124 This difficulty is compounded by the fact that
many seriously-ill patients do not qualify for participation in clinical trials and thus this type of
access is their only option.125 In essence, a person with their very life at stake and no other options is
at the greatest risk of making a poor decision, and thus requires an even higher level of protection.126
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While there are definable limits to individual autonomy and decision-making,127 the patient in
this context is seeking a potentially life-saving experimental treatment under the professional
supervision of their physician.128 Further, and this fact distinguishes the expanded access patient from
the physician-assisted suicide patient, the ultimate goal in seeking experimental treatment is an
extension of life. In the end-of-life context, many patients are either seeking to withdraw care or
directly end their life; and it is exactly this decision that triggers the government’s interest in
protecting their life.129 By contrast, the patient here is struggling to prolong their life by attempting to
access all available treatment options. It seems counterintuitive that, when a patient seeks death with
the assistance of a physician the government must immediately intervene in the interest of life, but
when a terminally-ill patient struggles to extend their life though experimental treatment, the
government has decided that the potential risks outweigh any benefit.130 As the former FDA official
said, more patients die waiting for good drugs than would have died from taking bad ones.131 But the
patient is not the only interest to be weighed in this analysis.
B. The Pharmaceutical Manufacturer
Although it might seem at first to be in a pharmaceutical manufacturer’s best interest to
support deregulating access to their drugs—it would allow drug makers to sell their product at market
value with minimal testing—several serious concerns arise. The first is the risk of tort liability arising

127

A key example of this concept is the fact that nearly every state has either banned or placed significant
restrictions on physician-assisted suicide. While—at the time of this writing—two states allow it (Oregon and
Washington), every other state has effectively banned the practice. The Supreme Court affirmed the states’ ability to
limit patient autonomy by holding that there is neither a due process nor equal protection right to physician-assisted
suicide. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 and Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997). Both cases stand as a
testament to the idea that the government can, in the name of protecting its citizen’s well-being, significantly limit
individual autonomy.
128
Janet L. Dolgin & Lois L. Shepherd, Bioethics and the Law 48 (2005). And this seems to be the crux of the
plaintiff’s argument in both Rutherford and Abigail Alliance.
129
See Washington and Vacco, supra note 138.
130
This is especially relevant in relation to section 312.305 of the 2009 regulations (discussed below).
131
Supra note 132.

20

out of pre-approval usage.132 As with any drug, there would be risks inherent in the use of a
developmental drug; but in this scenario—operating outside of the tight controls of a clinical trial—
predicting or anticipating any adverse reactions to the drug would be extremely difficult.133 The
potential for widespread harm to a particularly vulnerable patient population is only increased by the
fact that, without scientifically-derived protocols directing distribution and a dramatically increased
subject base, any response to an adverse event would be severely hampered.134
Despite attempts at disclaiming liability or instituting informed consent protocols,
pharmaceutical manufacturers would likely face a tidal wave of litigation arising out of expanded
access and the heightened likelihood of adverse events.135 It is hard to imagine that the prospect of
endless litigation and costly settlements would not discourage both pharmaceutical innovation and
development, especially where the speed at which the creation and marketing of new drugs already
lags so far behind other countries.136 Beyond the immediate legal concerns, this issue poses the
ethical question of whether allowing access to a relatively small number of individuals is worth
potentially stifling an industry capable of helping a vast number of people.137
C. The Regulator
As discussed above, the role of the regulator in this context is as seemingly simple and
straightforward as it is enormous. The FDA must—following the passage of the 1962 Amendments
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to the FDCA—assess all new drugs for both safety and efficacy.138 To accomplish this task the FDA
instituted the multi-phase clinical trial process, 139 and many argue that challenging this process
constitutes a direct challenge to the FDA’s very legitimacy and purpose.140 If the FDA is not
authorized or endowed with the authority to effectively regulate—in order to protect the public—new
drugs, then it seems to no longer serve a purpose.141
The FDA argues, as it did in Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v.
Eschenbach,142 that without completion of both Phase 1 and Phase 2 trials, there will be inherent
uncertainty concerning a new drug’s safety and effectiveness.143 Phase 1 testing alone—according to
many experts—is not sufficient to ascertain either safety or effectiveness for humans, and especially
not those actually afflicted with the targeted disease.144 Further, most drugs in Phase 1 trials are not
“life-saving”, and without complete testing a large number of ineffective and potentially dangerous
drugs could find their way to the patient population.145 Without the full “safety and efficacy”
assessment completed by the FDA in the first two phases of clinical trials, a developmental drug that
ended up having a smaller than expected benefit and a larger than expected adverse effect would not
be recognized until large numbers of patients had been exposed to it.146 An effective dismantling of
the FDA’s pre-market screening and monitoring system could ultimately permit the drug industry to
push potentially dangerous products to market in a manner not seen since the Thalidomide scare.147
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The FDA also claims that drug sponsors would not be able to fill their clinical trials if there
was a way for patients to circumvent the existing restrictions.148 Without a reason to participate in a
controlled trial—which carries the chance of receiving a placebo treatment instead of the new drug—
149

patients afflicted with the targeted illness would have no incentive to participate.150 Drugs sponsors

would be unable to move out of Phase 1 and into Phase 2 “safety and effectiveness” studies without
sufficient numbers of subjects suffering from the targeted disease or illness.151
V. WHAT THE FDA’S 2009 REGULATIONS GOT RIGHT, WHAT THEY GOT
WRONG, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT
Although the FDA purportedly promulgated its 2009 regulations in an effort to expand access
to developmental drugs, they ultimately only served to reinforce the agency’s existing practice.
Further, by interposing a distant, outside regulator152 into a decision-making process that should be
both deeply personal and individualized,153 the FDA’s regulations exceeded the agency’s statutory
authority. In an attempt to both critique the agency’s action and offer potential solutions, it would be
helpful to divide the analysis and look first to the statutory and practical problems created by the new
rules. Part B will then offer potential solutions for an expanded access scheme which seeks to address
the concerns of patients, the industry, and the FDA.
A. The FDA Exceeded Its Statutory Authority in Promulgating §312.305(a)(2) of the 2009
Regulations
In promulgating the 2009 rules—specifically §312.305(a)(2), which delegates to the FDA the
risk-benefit analysis determining whether a patient should receive a developmental drug—154the
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FDA has exceeded the statutory mandate of the FDAMA.155 In passing §360bbb of the FDAMA,
Congress delegated a very limited power to the FDA in the context of allowing access outside of
clinical trials, only intending it to play its traditional role of reviewing clinical data to inform
physician prescription practices.156 Section 360bbb does not at any point refer to individual patient
cost-benefit analysis and only authorizes an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence of safety
and efficacy.157 This clearly functions as a reinforcement of the spirit of the 1962 Amendments and
in no way expands the FDA’s authority beyond that point. In §312.305(a)(2), however, the FDA has
created a far more invasive role for itself by stating that the Secretary of HHS has both the discretion
and the authority—not to mention the scientific and medical expertise—to assess potential patient
benefits and risks and ultimately decide what is “best” for that patient.158 Assuming that an outside
regulatory body could—without first-hand knowledge of a patient’s condition—actually have a better
understanding of that patient’s immediate medical needs than her own doctor, Congress explicitly
prohibited just such agency action in the FDAMA.159 Section 360bbb very specifically reserved the
type of risk-benefit analysis at issue here for the physician and her patient.160
In promulgating §312.305(a)(2), the FDA not only interposed itself into a situation it does not
have the authority to encroach upon, it dramatically rewrote the fundamental role of the FDA.161 The
FDA—in one of its central operating manuals—defined its role in the clinical trial context as one of
reviewing information submitted by drug sponsors, aggregating and interpreting this data, and
offering this information as a foundation for prescribing physician’s treatment decisions.162 Section
360bbb(b)(1) of the FDAMA seems to reinforce this conclusion by giving physicians the authority to
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weigh and assess the relevant factors of an individual’s case in deciding treatment, while the FDA
has the authority to ensure that there is a sufficient evidential foundation supporting the decision.163
Simply ensuring that there is enough evidence to support a physician’s decision is a very different
proposition than attempting to ensure that the physician has made the right decision.
This type of institutionalized second-guessing of clinical treatment decisions has never been a
part of the FDA’s mandate, and Congress—in passing §360bbb and creating separate duties for
physicians and the FDA—164seems to have gone out of its way to reinforce this idea. Further, the
Supreme Court has held that an agency, absent explicit authorization from Congress, should not
assume “a responsibility that runs counter to its previously delegated powers and responsibilities.”165
In promulgating §312.305(a)(2), the FDA has both violated the Brown doctrine—by assuming a new
role that runs counter to previous duties—and overstepped the authority delegated by §360bbb of the
FDAMA, which merely served to reinforce the FDA’s previous practice of assessing safety and
efficacy. As long as patients are making reasoned and informed decisions in consultation with their
physician, the FDA should limit itself to assessing the adequacy and veracity of the data on safety
and efficacy, and not on the substance of the patient’s treatment decision.
B. Proposals for an Expanded Access Scheme that Serves the Patient, the Regulator, and the
Pharmaceutical Manufacturer
Historically, the FDA has only been one of many obstacles to expanded access. Perhaps the
principal limiting factor has been drug manufacturers’ unwillingness to shoulder the costs of
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participating in expanded access programs.166 Potentially increased liability due to adverse reactions
and decreased participation in clinical trials make expanded access economically unattractive.167 In
the past this had been compounded with FDA-mandated limitations on cost-recovery.168 Although
the FDA has amended the previous regulations to allow drug sponsors to recover the cost of
expanded access,169 this new cost recovery is limited to the direct costs of making the investigational
drug available, which are usually limited to the costs of manufacturing and shipping the drug, as well
as monitoring the treatment protocol.170 Balancing the risks and costs of participation for
pharmaceutical manufacturers is an essential aspect of a successful expanded access scheme.
The FDA’s recent decision to rule out recovery for the costs of research and development
will presumably decrease industry incentive to participate in expanded access programs.171 At the
very least, allowing a drug sponsor to provide their product at or near market value would make
participation in an expanded access program slightly more attractive. If industry was allowed to
recoup some of the cost of research and development—especially when the drug was still in the
testing phase and not bringing in any revenue—not only would incentive to participate increase,
incentive to introduce new treatments for less lucrative illnesses would increase. Especially in the
context of drugs targeted towards diseases that afflict a relatively small population-base, recovery at
or near market value for expanded access would function as an incentive for developing new drugs
for those illnesses. This does raise the specter of dubious sponsors proposing dubious drugs, but
§360bbb’s safety provisions provide a solid framework for vetting treatments introduced under this
new cost-recovery scheme. Increased cost-recovery also raises issues of payment and insurancecoverage; increased recovery for industry will mean increased cost for insurance providers. While
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this is a significant concern, it is one that many other industrialized nations have effectively
addressed.172 Even if a physician and patient have to negotiate or fight for insurance pre-certification
and coverage for a developmental treatment, that is an improvement on the status quo. Without
industry participation, and thus without developmental treatments, patients will not even have the
opportunity to request insurance coverage.
Similarly, in an attempt to strike a balance between expanding access, providing incentives to
industry, and maintaining its responsibility for monitoring the development of new drugs, the FDA’s
new regulations require that physicians overseeing the use of investigational drugs outside of clinical
trials report all outcomes, both positive and adverse.173 This is a clear example of the FDA’s 2009
regulations getting something right. The pharmaceutical industry has—since the beginning of
expanded access—voiced a concern that allowing participation outside of trials will stifle the
process. They argue that any patient who can access a drug outside of clinical trials, thus avoiding
potentially receiving a control group placebo, will do so. As access expands, trial participation will
shrink. This new provision will ensure that each instance of expanded access not only does not
interfere with clinical testing, but actually provides drug sponsors with another source of data that
could be reported to the FDA. In essence, industry is receiving a supplementary source of outcome
data which the FDA will accept and include in its final NDA analysis. These two measures, allowing
cost recovery at or near market value and mandated outcome reporting used to bolster existing
clinical trial data, should alleviate some of the pharmaceutical industry’s economic concerns over an
expanded access program.
172

Although it falls outside the scope of this paper, one proven solution to the problem of covering the increased
costs generated by expanded access is a single-payer healthcare system. Single-payer health systems in Western
Europe and Japan—because they function as a lone, somewhat monolithic entity—have far greater bargaining power
with the pharmaceutical manufacturer and thus usually pay far less than comparable U.S. providers. In essence, a
single-payer health system in the U.S. could presumably negotiate far lower prices for developmental drugs, while
still allowing the manufacturer to recover at the new (though lower) market rate. See generally T.R. Reid, The
Healing of America: A Global Quest for Better, Cheaper, and Fairer Health Care (2010).
173
21 C.F.R. §312.310(c)(2) (2011). The FDA has held that these reporting burdens should not exceed the typical
reporting done by physicians, but that under previously existing Treatment IND rules, a treating physician must
report all adverse reactions in the same way a trial sponsor would. See §312.310(a)(2).

27

With expanded access—especially access outside of the controlled environment of clinical
trials—an increase in tort claims arising out of adverse reactions seems unavoidable. As more and
more patients get access to drugs that have not fully completed “safety” and “effectiveness” testing,
instances of negative outcomes will likely rise. Industry concern over increasing liability has not
been addressed by the FDA in the past, and the 2009 regulations are no different. Although IRB
regulations prohibit asking a participant to waive any future tort or negligence claims,174 there are
effective tools for mitigating liability. An increased focus on the importance and practical
effectiveness of informed consent would be productive here. While many patients will not want to
risk the chance of adverse effects from experimental treatment, many will,175 and it is difficult to
justify respecting the preferences of one class of patients and not the other. Although there are
concerns over decision-making capacity, studies have shown that patients in the late stages of an
illness still make reasoned and informed decisions.176 Informed consent provides a framework in
which these preference-based decisions can be made and respected while also providing the drug
manufacturer with some level of liability protection.177 If the expanded access patient has made an
informed and reasoned decision, based on initial clinical data from the sponsor and guidance from
her physician, industry liability should be minimal. As long as the manufacturer follows the
guidelines set out in the IRB, IND, and NDA, responsibility for the patient’s decision should rest
with the patient. Which raises a final concern created by the 2009 regulations.

174

See supra note 50.
See Teresa J. Melink et al., The Impact of Phase 1 Clinical Trials on the Quality of Life in Patients with Cancer,
3 Anti-Cancer Drugs 571 (1992).
176
See generally Austin Winniford, Note, Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use: A Policy
Analysis and Legislative Proposal, 19 Health Matrix 205 (2009). Winniford discusses numerous studies on how
seriously-ill people handle decisions of this magnitude; although there is no easily-reached consensus among the
studies, a recent one has shown that even the most desperately ill patients have the capacity to effectively weigh the
benefits and risks involved in seeking experimental care. See David J. Casarett et al., Identifying Ambulatory Cancer
Patients at Risk of Impaired Capacity to Consent to Research, 26 J. Pain & Symptom Mgmt. 615 (2003).
177
In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del.Ch. 1996). A key case in which the court
established a standard of care based on the relevant statutory penalties for violative behavior. In this context,
§§312.60-70 could function similarly.
175

28

Section 312.60 mandates an intricate informed consent protocol that, while satisfactorily
addressing many of the industry concerns discussed above, makes the prescribing physician
responsible for any patient decisions made under the influence of her medical judgment.178 Failure to
follow these strict rules may result in loss of investigator privileges179 and—because these rules could
ultimately inform standards of care—open the practitioner up to medical malpractice claims.180 By
requiring a prescribing physician to essentially be as knowledgeable about the developmental drug
and its attendant usage protocols as its sponsor,181 as well as potentially liable if the treatment is for
any reason contraindicated for that patient, the FDA’s 2009 regulations establish a significant burden
of care for the physician. And while this new standard of care makes the secondary FDA analysis
required by §312.305 both redundant and cumbersome,182 it will also presumably reduce physician
participation rates.
A significant liability burden is placed on the prescribing physician when they must know as
much about the drug as its sponsor, and the risk of increased negligence claims resulting from
expanded access will most likely drive down physician participation. However, a slight rewording of
§312.60 should alleviate the concerns of prescribing physicians. While the 2009 regulations shifted
the informed consent burden from the sponsor to the physician, which is entirely appropriate in the
expanded access context, they failed to elucidate a clear and coherent standard of care. Rather than
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let a court determine what the standard of care is by assessing the intent of the regulation’s punitive
measures,183 the FDA should have created an explicit standard for a physician prescribing a
developmental drug. In the medical malpractice context generally, most states use the “what would a
reasonable physician in a similar situation have done” standard, which essentially looks to the
common medical practice appropriate for that scenario.184 Similarly, a re-drafting of §312.60 which
explicitly establishes a “common practice” protocol for the expanded access physician would
alleviate concerns over increased liability. The FDA should re-draft the regulation—with input from
physicians who regularly prescribe and administer experimental treatments—in such a way that any
potential prescriber has no doubt as to what his or her obligations are. A clear and explicit standard of
care for the prescription and administration of developmental treatments would not only protect the
patients who might receive the drug, it would offer a substantial liability shield for the prescribing
physician.
CONCLUSION
While the risk of adverse effects for patients and economic burdens for manufacturers is very
real and plays a significant role here, arguably the greatest obstacle to expanded access created by the
2009 regulations is §312.305(a)(2). Whatever improvements the new rules effected are negligible
compared to the enormous setback §312.305(a)(2) constitutes. Its severe and unprecedented
restriction on patient autonomy effectively eliminates choice in a scenario where choosing between
treatments truly is a life or death proposition. Therefore, changing §312.305(a)(2) is essential to
expanding access to developmental drugs.
Although the FDA has explicitly and repeatedly rejected calls for a re-wording of
§312.305(a)(2),185 this would seem to be the simplest and most direct route to rectifying the FDA’s
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overstep here. Congress could amend the FDCA186 to directly address the issue, including language
specifically separating the analysis done by physicians and the analysis done by the FDA.
Congressional action of this sort would make §312.305(a)(2) immediately invalid and subject to
litigation if the FDA does not alter it. Patients or patient’s rights groups could also challenge the
regulation on the grounds that it exceeds the statutory delegation of authority provided by §360bbb of
the FDAMA, therefore constituting an agency overreach of the type seen in Brown.187
While litigation could force the FDA’s hand, and Congressional action could clarify
misconceptions and cement the parallel but separate functions of physicians and the FDA, both of
these options are expensive and time-consuming. The simplest, most efficient, and most direct form
of change in this circumstance would be remedial action by the FDA itself. In crafting the provisions
outlining the physician’s responsibilities under the new framework, the FDA imported the exact
language from the FDAMA.188 It would be difficult to argue that simply importing the FDAMA’s
language on the separate function of the FDA in this context would be untenable. In promulgating
§312.305(a)(2), the FDA overstepped the authority granted it by Congress, and a simple re-wording
of that subsection would radically alter the new regulations’ impact on the seriously and terminallyill. A revised subsection—which echoed the mandate of §360bbb—would firmly place a deeply
personal and life-altering decision in the hands of the individuals most qualified to make it, the
patient and her physician.
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